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INTRODUCTION 
How does Chief Justice John Roberts approach questions of 
statutory interpretation? Recent decisions provide some clues, and also 
suggest how his approach to statutory interpretation fits with his 
“minimalist” judicial philosophy.1 
In King v. Burwell, Chief Justice John Roberts explained that it was 
necessary to “depart” from what might be the “most natural reading” of 
the statutory text in order to conclude that the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) authorized tax credits for the purchase of 
health insurance in exchanges established by the federal government.2 
 
 †  Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & 
Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. This article is based upon remarks 
delivered at the Cardozo Law Review symposium, “Ten Years the Chief: Examining a Decade of 
John Roberts on the Supreme Court,” at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, October 15, 
2015. The author would like to thank Shannon Meyer for her research assistance. Any errors, 
omissions, or inanities are solely the fault of the author. 
1 For this author’s earlier analysis of the Chief Justice’s judicial minimalism, see Jonathan H. 
Adler, Judicial Minimalism, the Mandate, and Mr. Roberts, in THE HEALTH CARE CASES: THE 
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (N. Persily, G. Metzger, & T. Morrison, eds., 
2013). This essay both modifies and expands upon this earlier anlaysis. 
 2 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015) (“In this instance, the context and structure 
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The relevant statutory text referred exclusively and repeatedly to 
exchanges “established by the State.”3 Despite the apparent clarity of this 
phrase, Chief Justice Roberts found ambiguity when the tax credit 
provisions were placed within the broader context of the PPACA as a 
whole, and then relied upon the statutory context and structure again to 
conclude tax credits would be available.4 
In concluding the PPACA authorized tax credits in exchanges 
established by the federal government, the Chief Justice did not rely 
upon, or even reference, traditional canons of statutory interpretation.5 
The Chief’s King majority relied upon structure and context first to find 
ambiguity, and again to resolve it, eschewing Chevron deference.6 
 
of the Act compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the 
pertinent statutory phrase.”) (emphasis added). 
 3 42 U.S.C. § 18031(a) (2010) (The ACA authorizes unlimited start-up funds for state-run 
exchanges and incentivizes states to establish exchanges by conditioning renewal of those funds on 
both progress establishing an exchange and implementation of other parts of the act.); Id. § 18031 
(b)(1) (“Each State shall . . . establish an . . . Exchange.”); Id. § 18031 (d)(1) (“An Exchange shall 
be a governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is established by a State.”); Id. § 18031 (d)(3)(B) 
(Congress authorizes that states may require additional benefits but must assume the cost and make 
payments.); id. § 18031 (d)(5)(A) (“No Federal funds for continued operations. In establishing an 
Exchange under this section, the State shall ensure . . . ”) (emphasis added). 
 4 For an extensive critique of the Chief Justice’s opinion, see Jonathan H. Adler & Michael 
Cannon, King v. Burwell and the Triumph of Selective Contextualism, 15 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35 
(2015). 
 5 See Abbe R. Gluck, Congress Has a “Plan” and the Court Can Understand It—The Court 
rises to the challenge of statutory complexity in King v. Burwell, SCOTUSBLOG, June 26, 2015, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-congress-has-a-plan-and-the-court-can-
understand-it-the-court-rises-to-the-challenge-of-statutory-complexity-in-king-v-burwell  (“King 
is one of the only major text-oriented statutory interpretation decisions in recent memory in which 
the majority opinion barely includes a single canon of interpretation.”); see also Abbe R. Gluck, 
Imperfect Statutues, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Orthodox 
Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 64 (2015) (KING “holds that the assumptions of perfection 
underlying the canons are unrealistic as applied to the ACA”). 
  Interestingly enough, the Chief Justice did not rely much upon legislative history either. See 
id. at 66 (noting King majority’s emphasis on legislative “plan” did not “mean a resort to legislative 
history or other subjective factors maligned by textualists”); Adler and Cannon, supra note __ at 
50 (“did not rely much on traditional sources of legislative history to determine Congress’s unstated 
purpose, and was quite selective in the sources of legislative history it did cite.”). This may be due 
to the fact that there was relatively little legislative history that spoke to the question, and even less 
that was supportive of the federal government’s position in King. See id. at 37-40 (discussing 
relevant legislative history of PPACA); Jonathan H. Adler & Michael Cannon, Taxation without 
Representation: The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH 
MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 119, 148-67 (2013) (same).. 
 6 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490–91 (Chief Justice Roberts asserts that viewed in a broader context 
Section 36B is ambiguous although at first blush it may seem clear; Roberts chose the interpretation 
he felt “fit best with the statutory context.” The opinion also finds that several provisions in the Act 
that assume tax credits will be available on both state and federal exchanges and “Thus, the meaning 
of that phrase may not be as clear as it appears when read out of context.”). Id. at 2496 (Roberts 
concludes the decision saying, because it is possible, the Court must avoid undermining the Act’s 
goal of improving health care markets.). See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael Cannon, King v. Burwell 
and the Triumph of Selective Textualism, 15 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 52–63 (2015). 
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Whatever the merits of this approach, it was not textualism as we’ve 
come to know it.7 
King was not the first case in which the Chief Justice found it 
necessary to reject the plain meaning of relevant statutory phrases or 
provisions in resolving a case. Indeed, it was not even the first time he 
had done so in a case involving the PPACA.8 In both major health care 
cases, the Chief Justice authored opinions that expressly departed from 
plain meaning, and in both cases the practical consequences of these 
departures was to reduce the potential disruption caused by the Court’s 
ultimate judgment. 
These decisions are not aberrations. They are of a piece with the 
Chief Justice’s pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation which, in 
turn, is but one part of his “minimalist” jurisprudence.9 While he often 
pays careful attention to statutory text, Chief Justice Roberts is not an 
Antonin-Scalia-style textualist. In his first ten years on the Court, the 
Chief has been quite willing to stretch or massage relevant statutory 
provisions where necessary to avoid interpretations that would require 
invalidating federal statutes on constitutional grounds or would otherwise 
prove disruptive to the status quo.. This preference for limiting the 
disruptive impact of the Court’s decisions takes priority over any 
commitment to a particular interpretive technique or broader doctrinal 
outcomes. 
The claim of this brief essay is that the Chief Justice’s approach to 
statutory interpretation exhibits a “Burkean minimalism” that seeks to 
reduce seismic effect of the Court’s decisions.10 In particular, the Chief 
Justice is drawn toward statutory interpretations that avoid constitutional 
questions and preserve legislative enactments against constitutional 
 
 7 See Gluck, Congress Has a “Plan”, supra note __ (“This is not Antonin Scalia’s 
textualism.”). For a greater discussion of this issue, see Gluck, Imperfect Statutues, supra note __. 
 8 See infra Part II. 
 9 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2006. For an empirical 
assessment of Chief Justice Roberts’ minimalism, see Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-
Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1045, 1089–90 (2009) (finding the Chief Justice to be more minimalist than other 
conservative justices on the Court). For a broader perspective on the Roberts Court, see J. Michell 
Pickerill & Artemus Ward, Measuring Judicial Minimalism on the Roberts Court, Paper Prepared 
for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Sept. 1, 2013), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2314135.  On judicial minimalism generally, see 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
(1999). For a critique, see Diane S. Sykes, Minimalism and Its Limits, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
17 (2015). 
 10 See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 358–59 (2006) (noting 
that “Burkean minimalists prize stability” and will depart from other doctrinal commitments so as 
not to “disrupt established practices.”). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 509 (1996). 
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challenge.11 Avoiding disruption is not an unyielding imperative, as the 
Chief Justice is sometimes willing to join broad judgments with 
significant effects. Avoiding disruption does, however, appear to be 
among the Chief Justice’s preferences when deciding cases, and when 
interpreting federal statutes in particular. 
I.     MINIMALISM AND MR. ROBERTS 
Since his appointment to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts 
has emphasized the value of narrow decisions that may command broad 
agreement amongst his colleagues.12 At his confirmation hearings, then-
Judge Roberts stressed his desire to foster “a greater degree of coherence 
and consensus in the opinions of the court.”13 In a 2006 speech at 
Georgetown shortly after his confirmation to the Court, the Chief Justice 
reiterated his desire for greater unanimity on the Court.14 Decisions in 
which the Court is unanimous (or nearly so), he explained, “promote 
clarity and guidance for the lawyers and for the lower courts trying to 
figure out what the Supreme Court meant.”15 
Reaching broader agreement often requires narrowing the scope of 
a decision. To Chief Justice Roberts, this is a feature, not a bug. As he 
explained: “If it’s not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, in 
my view it is necessary not to decide more. The broader the agreement 
among the justices, the more likely it is that the decision is on the 
narrowest possible ground.”16 In the case of statutes, resolving cases on 
the “narrowest possible ground” often entails reading statutes so as to 
avoid constitutional questions or incongruous results. 
The preference for greater unanimity and narrower focus in judicial 
opinions follows from the Chief Justice’s view of the proper judicial role. 
 
 11 In this regard, this essay expands upon and refines the argument in Jonathan H. Adler, 
Judicial Minimalism, the Mandate, and Mr. Roberts, in THE HEALTH CARE CASES: THE SUPREME 
COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (N. Persily, G. Metzger, & T. Morrison, eds., 2013). 
12 See Neal K. Katyal, The Supreme Court’s Powerful New Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, June 
26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/opinion/the-supreme-courts-powerful-new-
consensus.html. 
13 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement 
of John G. Roberts, Jr.), reprinted as Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., of Maryland, to be Chief 
Justice of the United States, in 20 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND 
REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-2005, , at 371 (Roy M. Mersky & Tobe Liebert, eds., 2006). 
 14 See Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Address at the 2006 Georgetown Law Center 
Commencement Ceremony (May 21, 2006), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/
eventDetail.cfm?eventID=144. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
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As he explained when he was nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, his judicial philosophy “begins with an appreciation of 
the limited role of a judge in our system of divided powers.”17 That 
“limited role” consists of “discerning the law, not shaping policy” and 
requires that judges exercise “self-restraint.”18 
Judicial restraint can take many forms. For Chief Justice Roberts, it 
manifests itself in adopting narrow rulings and avoiding unnecessary 
constitutional judgments, as well as by striving to uphold legislative 
enactments.19 Although Chief Justice Roberts has joined decisions 
striking down federal statutes on constitutional grounds, he has authored 
several opinions that strained to interpret congressional acts so as to 
preserve their constitutionality. Where constitutional infirmities have 
been found, he has also sought to excise them with surgical precision, 
leaving as much of the legislature’s handiwork intact. These tendencies 
are evidence of the Chief Justice’s preference for minimalism. 
Whereas various formulations of judicial minimalism often stress 
the need to respect and defer to the political branches, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s minimalism seems equally concerned with the potential 
ramifications of judicial decisions for the political system. In this regard, 
the Chief Justice’s efforts have met with some success.20 The Roberts 
Court has overturned federal statutes and applicable precedents at a lower 
rate than its immediate predecessors.21 But Roberts has also seemed 
interested in reducing the practical impact of his rulings. If, in his 
infamous formulation, the role of a judge is that of an umpire, it seems 
that the Chief Justice seeks to avoid making calls that control the outcome 
of the game. In this way, we can connect the Chief Justice’s preference 
for constitutional avoidance with some of his other more notable statutory 
interpretation decisions. 
 
 17 Quoted in Adam J. White, Judging Roberts: The Chief Justice of the United States, Ten Years 
In, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 23, 2015. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Sykes, supra note 9, at 19 (Minimalism “self-consciously avoids invalidating acts of the 
legislative and executive branches either by upholding them on the merits or by using various 
techniques for avoiding constitutional questions.”). For an argument that Chief Justice Roberts is 
more deferential to the legislature than to the executive, see White, supra note 17. 
 20 See Pickerill & Ward, supra note 9; see also Sykes, supra note 9, at 31 (a “noteworthy 
feature” of the Roberts Court is “its preference for using minimalist techniques to avoid or soften 
or at least postpone confrontation with the political branches in structurally or politically sensitive 
cases.”). 
 21 See Adam J. Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 24, 2010 (reporting that the Roberts Court invalidates statutes and overturns precedents at a 
lower rate than the Rehnquist and Burger Courts). 
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II.     OBAMACARE AND SCOTUSCARE22 
The ink on the PPACA was scarcely dry before its constitutionality 
was challenged in federal court.23 These challenges eventually made their 
way to One First Street in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius (hereinafter NFIB).24 In deciding NFIB, both in rejecting 
challenges to the “individual mandate” and rejecting challenges to the 
Medicaid expansion, Chief Justice Roberts demonstrated a willingness to 
stretch the relevant statutory text so as to avoid an unduly disruptive 
result. 
The central issue in NFIB was whether the so-called “individual 
mandate” could be justified as an exercise of one of Congress’s 
enumerated powers. Under § 5000A(a) of the PPACA, all non-exempt 
individuals “shall” obtain qualifying health insurance.25 Any non-exempt 
individual who fails to comply with this mandate is subject to a penalty.26 
Those challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate 
focused on whether this provision could be justified as an exercise of 
Congress’s power to regulate commerce “among the several states,”27 
either alone or in conjunction with the “necessary and proper clause.”28 
This is because the language of the statute presented the mandate as just 
that: a mandate to obtain insurance that was enforced with a penalty. In 
enacting the mandate, Congressional leaders had cited the commerce 
power as the basis for this enactment.29 Although it might have been 
easier to justify the penalty for noncompliance as a tax, thereby resting 
 
 22 In his King dissent, the late Justice Antonin Scalia suggested the PPACA should be known 
as “SCOTUSCare.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2507 (2015). 
 23 See Charles Dharapak, 13 Attorneys General Sue Over Health Care Overhaul, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-23-attorneys-general-
health-suit_N.htm. (“Attorneys general from 13 states sued the federal government Tuesday, 
claiming the landmark health care overhaul bill is unconstitutional just seven minutes after 
President Obama signed it into law.”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 
S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (“On the day the President signed the Act into law, Florida and 12 other 
States filed a complaint in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida.”). 
 24 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 25 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012). 
 26 § 5000A(b)(1)–(3). 
 27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . ”). 
 29 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593 (“Congress thought it could enact such a command under the 
Commerce Clause, and the Government primarily defended the law on that basis.”); see also Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–48, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health 
Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–52, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 18091) (Congress finding the individual mandate is “ . . . commercial and economic in 
nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce . . . ”); 156 CONG. REC. H1826 (daily ed. Mar. 
21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Slaughter) (arguing that that the individual mandate falls within 
Congress’s authority to regulate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce). 
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the provision on Congress’s taxing power, Congressional leaders and the 
President himself denied that the penalty for noncompliance was a tax.30 
Chief Justice Roberts agreed that the “most straightforward reading 
of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance.”31 
Yet, the Chief Justice concluded, the mandate could not be sustained on 
that basis.32 The power to regulate commerce among the several states, 
even when supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, does not 
empower the federal government to require everyone to purchase a 
specified good or service. Therefore, the Chief Justice concluded, it was 
“necessary” to consider whether the mandate could be upheld on an 
alternative basis. 
Looking beyond the text of the statute, and examining how the 
individual mandate would operate in practice, the Chief Justice concluded 
that Congress could require those who fail to obtain qualifying health 
insurance to pay a modest penalty.33 Although not characterized as a tax 
by Congress, the fee would operate as a tax.34 Like many other provisions 
of federal law, the PPACA would impose a slightly greater tax burden on 
those who fail to engage in congressionally desired activity. As the Chief 
Justice explained, the question for the Court was not whether mandate 
penalty as a tax was the “most natural reading” of the relevant statutory 
language, but only “whether it is a fairly possible one.”35 Reading the 
statute in this way, although not necessarily true to the words Congress 
chose, enabled the Chief Justice to refrain from invalidating a key 
provision of the PPACA. 
Because the individual mandate was designed to interact with other 
provisions of the PPACA, invalidating this single provision could have 
had destabilizing effects on other parts of the law.36 Upholding the 
mandate penalty as a tax avoided this potential outcome. Although the 
Chief Justice did vote to invalidate another portion of the PPACA – 
specifically the conditioning of federal Medicaid funds on a state’s 
willingness to implement the Medicaid expansion – he again departed 
 
 30 See, e.g., Transcript: Interview by George Stephanopoulos with President Obama, ABC 
News, (Sept. 18, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/Politics/transcript-president-barack-
obama/story?id=8618937 (claiming individual mandate “is absolutely not a tax increase.”); Susan 
Jones, Pelosi: Individual Mandate Isn’t a Tax: ‘No, It’s Penalty, No, It’s a Penalty, It’s a Penalty’, 
CNS NEWS (July 2, 2012, 6:06 a.m.), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/pelosi-individual-mandate-
isn-t-tax-no-it-s-penalty-no-it-s-penalty-it-s-penalty (discussing Pelosi’s insistence the individual 
is not a tax but rather a penalty for free riders). 
 31 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 2594 (“. . . it makes going without insurance just another thing the Government taxes, 
like buying gasoline or earning income.”).  
 34 Id. (“It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a ‘penalty,’ not a ‘tax.’”).  
 35 Id. 
 36 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2675. 
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from the plain language of the statute to reduce the potential disruptive 
impact of this holding. 
A key feature of the PPACA was the expansion of coverage for low-
income populations through the expansion of the federal Medicaid 
program. Historically, the Medicaid program targeted specific highly 
vulnerable populations, such as children, pregnant women, the elderly, 
and disabled individuals.37 Under the PPACA, however, Medicaid was 
expanded to provide coverage to all adults with incomes below 133 
percent of the federal poverty line.38 In order to induce state cooperation, 
the federal government agreed to cover the lion’s share of costs of the 
expansion for the first several years. Were a state to refuse the expansion, 
however, that state would sacrifice all federal Medicaid funding, 
including support for coverage of previously eligible populations. 
Seven justices concluded that requiring states to accept the Medicaid 
expansion as a condition of continuing to receive existing Medicaid funds 
was unconstitutionally coercive.39 For four justices, this conclusion 
justified invalidating all of the PPACA’s Medicaid provisions.40 For 
Chief Justice Roberts, however, the unconstitutional coercion in the 
PPACA justified a less disruptive remedy, albeit one without any 
statutory basis. 
In his controlling NFIB opinion, Chief Justice Roberts concluded 
that the proper remedy for the coercive nature of the Medicaid expansion 
was to decouple the offer of funding for the Medicaid expansion from 
pre-existing Medicaid.41 In effect, the Chief Justice treated pre-existing 
Medicaid and the Medicaid expansion as two separate programs that 
states could accept or reject independently.42 
The problem with the Chief Justice’s approach, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, is that there is nothing in the PPACA that 
separates “old” and “new” Medicaid.43 The two programs are not separate 
 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2013); NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2572. 
 38 See id. at 2581–82; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2012). 
 39 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2666–67. 
 40 Indeed, the four joint dissenters concluded that the entire PPACA had to be invalidated due 
to their conclusion that the Medicaid expansion and individual mandate were unconstitutional. Id. 
at 2675–76. 
41 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2607. 
 42 This same analysis also supported the Chief Justice’s substantive conclusion as to the 
unconstitutionality of the offer to states, as the Chief Justice concluded that Congress was, in effect, 
leveraging state participation in “old” Medicaid to induce cooperation with “new” Medicaid. Id. at 
2608 (the Chief Justice saying, “. . . Congress assumed that every State would participate in the 
Medicaid expansion, given that States had no real choice but to do so.”) See also Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 
868–871 (2013). 
 43 Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging Into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 55 (2013) (noting “the 
artificial distinction” the Chief Justice’s opinion “forges between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Medicaid”). 
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in the Act, nor in the U.S. Code. The PPACA does not characterize or 
treat the programs differently.44 The PPACA expanded Medicaid by 
changing the conditions upon which states receive Medicaid funds. It did 
not enact a new program, or even a separate subpart. Whether or not it is 
fair to characterize the Medicaid expansion as, in operation, a materially 
different program from what existed before, such a characterization has 
little basis in the relevant statutory text. Yet interpreting expansion as 
separate program facilitated a less disruptive outcome than would have 
been required by invalidating the Medicaid expansion altogether. 
Whereas Congress enacted the Medicaid expansion as a set of new 
conditions on the continued receipt of Medicaid funds, the Chief Justice 
interpreted the statute to create a new program that could be accepted or 
rejected independently. 
III.     CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 
NFIB was not the first time that the Chief Justice would show a 
willingness to adopt a saving construction of a statute in order to deflect 
a constitutional challenge to a federal statute, and it would not be the last. 
In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder 
(hereinafter NAMUDNO),45 the Chief Justice adopted a strained and 
scarcely plausible interpretation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
(hereinafter VRA) in order to preserve portions of the statute against a 
constitutional attack.46 Although the Chief Justice’s opinion was not 
particularly persuasive as a matter of statutory interpretation, it was 
joined by seven other justices and preserved the section 5, at least for a 
time.47 
Congress enacted the VRA to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment 
guarantee that the “right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition 
 
 44 See NFIB,132 S.Ct. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Medicaid, as amended by the ACA, 
however, is not two spending programs; it is a single program with a constant aim—to enable poor 
persons to receive basic health care when they need it.”). The only distinction in the statute is that 
the rates of federal reimbursement of state costs is different for previously eligible populations and 
newly eligible populations. Id. at 2632 (“In 2014, federal funds will cover 100% of the costs for 
newly eligible beneficiaries; that rate will gradually decrease before settling at 90% in 2020. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396d(y) (2006 ed., Supp. IV). By comparison, federal contributions toward the care of 
beneficiaries eligible pre-ACA range from 50% to 83%, and averaged 57% between 2005 and 
2008.”). 
45 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
 46  See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 
2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 181, 182-83 (2009) (noting Court adopted “an implausible reading of a statute 
that appeared contrary to textual analysis, congressional intent, and administrative interpretation.”). 
 47 A majority of the Supreme Court would subsequently invalidate section 5 of the VRA in 
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2632 (2013). 
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of servitude.”48 The law bars discriminatory election procedures and 
practices nationwide and imposes additional restrictions on those 
portions of the country with a history of voting discrimination. 
Specifically, section 5 requires designated jurisdictions (so-called 
“covered jurisdictions”) to obtain the federal government’s permission 
before making any changes to existing voting procedures or practices, 
including voter eligibility requirements and polling locations.49 
“Covered jurisdictions” are those jurisdictions that had employed 
discriminatory or otherwise prohibited voting practices and in which 
fewer than fifty percent of eligible voters were registered or voted in the 
1964 presidential election.50 Such jurisdictions may only alter voting 
practices or procedures by obtaining “preclearance” from the attorney 
general or a three-judge federal district court on the basis that the change 
neither “has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race or color.”51 “Covered jurisdictions” 
that wish to be free of section 5’s limitations may file a declaratory 
judgment seeking to “bail out” from the preclearance requirements.52 In 
such a suit, the jurisdiction must show that it has not engaged in any 
proscribed voting rights violations within the previous ten years and that 
it has taken steps to prevent voter intimidation and harassment.53 
The Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 filed suit 
challenging the preclearance provisions on the basis that these 
requirements could no longer be considered “congruent and 
proportional” to the rights violations they were designed to address.54 
This claim received some force from the fact that Congress had twice 
renewed the VRA without updating the formula upon which the “covered 
jurisdiction” determinations are made.55 Whatever the scope of voting 
rights violations today, NAMUDNO argued, they bear little relationship 
to those in 1964. In the alternative, NAMUDNO also argued that it was 
a “political subdivision” that should be permitted to bail out from the 
preclearance requirements. The problem with this argument was that the 
plain text of section 5 seemed to limit bailout suits to states and those 
political subdivisions separately designated for coverage under the act, 
 
 48  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 86 S. Ct. 803, 816–817 (1966) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. 
XV).. 
 49 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012). 
 50 § 10303(b). 
 51 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (originally enacted as 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (1956)). 
 52 52 U.S.C § 10303 (originally enacted as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973c(a)). 
 53 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (originally enacted as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(F)). 
54 See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 204. 
55 See id. at 200 (noting “coverage formula remained the same” with each VRA 
reauthorizations). 
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and a local utility district in Texas would not seem to qualify.56 
The plain text of the VRA notwithstanding, eight justices concluded 
that NAMUDNO could bail out of section 5’s preclearance 
requirements.57 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court noted the 
potential constitutional difficulties posed by section 5, but shrunk from 
confronting them.58 Quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
admonition that overturning a duly enacted act of Congress is “the gravest 
and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform,” Roberts 
noted that the Court should avoid reaching constitutional questions “if 
there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.”59 
NAMUDNO’s alternative statutory argument provided this alternative 
basis, even if the text of the VRA did not.60 
Roberts’s opinion acknowledged that the text of the VRA did not 
appear to support NAMUDNO’s bailout claim, as the district court had 
concluded.61 Yet the “underlying constitutional concerns” with such an 
interpretation “compel[led] a broader reading of the bailout provision,” 
even if there was little basis in the VRA’s text or history to support it.62 
By comparison Roberts’s interpretation of the individual mandate penalty 
as a “tax” is thoroughly persuasive. 
Roberts’s strained effort to save section 5 was not likely motivated 
by any specific desire to save this particular provision of federal law. 
There is no reason to believe that the Chief Justice is particularly 
sympathetic to the VRA generally or section 5 in particular. Indeed, just 
four years after stretching to preserve section 5 in NAMUDNO, the Chief 
Justice would author the Court’s opinion in Shelby County v. Holder 
invalidating the coverage formula that determines where section 5 
applies.63 According to the Chief Justice, the Court’s NAMUDNO 
opinion had placed Congress on notice of the VRA’s potential 
constitutional infirmities, and Congress failed to act. Thus, the Court had 
“no choice” but to confront the underlying constitutional question.64 
 
 56 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 230–231 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
 57 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009). 
 58 Id. (“Whether conditions continue to justify such legislation is a difficult constitutional 
question we do not answer today. We conclude instead that the Voting Rights Act permits all 
political subdivisions, including the district in this case, to seek relief from its preclearance 
requirements.”) 
 59 Id. at 204–05 (citations omitted). 
 60 See Sykes, supra note 9, at 32 (in order to conclude NAMUDNO was eligible for 
preclearance, “the Court had to stretch the statutory definition of ‘political subdivision’ well beyond 
its text.”); see also Hasen, supra note __.. 
 61 NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 206–07. 
 62 Id. at 207. 
 63 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
64 Id. at 2631 (“Congress could have updated the coverage formula [after NAMUDNO], but did 
not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional. 
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The Chief Justice again adopted an implausible statutory 
interpretation in order to deflect a constitutional challenge in Bond v. 
United States.65 The facts of Bond are made for bad television. Carol 
Anne Bond sought revenge on her husband’s mistress—her once-best 
friend, Myrlinda Haynes—who was pregnant with Bond’s husband’s 
child. So she did what any other angry, jealous microbiologist would do: 
she obtained highly toxic chemicals and sought to poison Haynes by 
spreading the toxins on Haynes’s car door, mailbox and door knob. These 
efforts were unsuccessful, but did lead to Bond’s arrest and indictment 
for violating the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act,66 
enacted by Congress to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Bond challenged her conviction on statutory and constitutional 
grounds. Among other things, she argued that the Implementation Act 
was unconstitutional, at least as applied to her conduct, as it exceeded the 
scope of Congress’s enumerated powers. Lower courts rejected these 
arguments, but they found a more receptive audience on the Supreme 
Court. 
The Supreme Court unanimously overturned Bond’s conviction. 
Four justices would have reached the constitutional question, but not the 
Chief Justice. Writing for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts 
held that the Implementation Act could not be read so as to apply to 
purely “local” crimes, such as were involved here.67 “Because our 
constitutional structure leaves local criminal activity primarily to the 
states, we have generally declined to read the federal law as intruding on 
that responsibility, unless Congress has clearly indicated that the law 
should have such reach,” Roberts explained.68 Although the plain text of 
the Act would seem to cover Bond’s conduct, such an interpretation 
would “‘dramatically intrude[] upon traditional state criminal 
jurisdiction,’ and we avoid reading statutes to have such reach in the 
absence of clear indication that they do.”69 
The Chief Justice’s Bond opinion reads as if the Court was asked to 
resolve a statutory ambiguity or choose between competing-yet-plausible 
interpretations of expansive statutory text. But the text of the 
Implementation Act is rather clear, as Justice Scalia detailed in his 
concurring opinion. In Scalia’s view, the Chief Justice had engaged in 
“result-driven antitextualism” so as to avoid confronting the 
 
The formula in that section can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to 
preclearance.”). 
 65 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 66 Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–277, 112 Stat. 
2681–856 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) 
 67 134 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 2088 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971)). 
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constitutionality of the statute.70 The toxic chemicals Bond employed 
easily satisfied the Act’s definition of prohibited “chemical weapons.” It 
is likewise hard to argue that trying to poison someone constitutes a 
peaceful purpose exempt from the Act.71 The alleged ambiguity that 
enabled the Court’s resort to constitutional avoidance was only revealed 
by the potential consequences of applying the plain statutory text.72 
As in King v. Burwell, the Chief Justice’s statutory interpretation in 
Bond appears driven by a desire to avoid potentially disruptive 
consequences. Such consequences induce a conclusion that the relevant 
statutory text is ambiguous, which then provides the Court with the 
necessary interpretive flexibility to avoid the potentially disruptive 
result—in this case, either validating a radically expansive interpretation 
of the federal government’s treaty power or striking down a validly 
enacted federal law. 
What distinguishes the Chief Justice’s opinion in King v. Burwell 
from NFIB, NAMUDNO, Bond, and perhaps even Citizens United was 
not the Chief Justice’s willingness to look beyond the plain statutory text 
enacted by Congress in search of a broader purpose or in pursuit of a more 
rational legislative scheme. What was different was the lack of 
constitutional avoidance concerns.Interestingly enough, multiple amici in 
King had argued that the Court should conclude tax credits were available 
in federal exchanges because an alternative ruling might raise federalism 
concerns.73 Although this issue was raised at oral argument,74 there was 
 
 70 Id. at 2095 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Bond 
v. United States: Concurring in the Judgment, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 285, 287 (2014) (the 
majority opinion in Bond provides an “object lesson in dodgy statutory interpretation”). 
 71 See 134 S.Ct. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) 
[1] Bond possessed and used “chemical[s] which through [their] chemical 
action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or 
permanent harm.” [2] Thus, she possessed “toxic chemicals.” [3] And, 
because they were not possessed or used only for a “purpose not prohibited,” 
§229F(1)(A), they were “chemical weapons.” Ergo, Bond violated the Act. 
End of statutory analysis, I would have thought. 
 72 See id. at 2095–96 (“Though the Court relied in part on federalism-inspired interpretive 
presumption, it did so only after it had found, in Part I of the opinion, applying traditional 
interpretive tools, that the text in question was ambiguous.”). 
73 See Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance, 
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); Brief for Professor Thomas W. Merrill, et 
al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-
114); Brief of Amici Curiae Jewish Alliance for Law & Social Action (JALSA), et al., in Support 
of Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No 14-114). 
74 See Transcript of Oral argument at 16, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114) 
(“JUSTICE KENNEDY: Let me say that from the standpoint of the dynamics of Federalism, it 
does seem to me that there is something very powerful to the point that if your argument is accepted, 
the States are being told either create your own Exchange, or we’ll send your insurance market into 
a death spiral.”). 
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no mention of any such concerns in Roberts’s opinion for the Court.75 
The Chief Justice is not always successful in adopting statutory 
interpretations that save federal statutes from constitutional challenge. 
NAMUDNO and Bond suggest there are few limits to the Chief Justice’s 
willingness to stretch statutory text. But it is not always possible for the 
Chief Justice to convince enough of his colleagues to go along. Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission76 may be a case in point. 
Citizens United concerned a challenge to provisions of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), specifically Section 203, 
which barred corporations and unions from spending general treasury 
funds on an “electioneering communication,” defined as a “broadcast, 
cable or satellite communication which refers to a candidate for federal 
office” aired within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general 
election.77 The petitioners, Citizens United, had sought to air an anti–
Hillary Clinton video on cable networks as a video-on-demand feature.78 
Such a broadcast would almost certainly have constituted a “cable . . . 
communication.” Consequently, distributing the video in this fashion 
would have been covered by the act.79 Holding otherwise, and defining 
cable video-on-demand as something other than a “cable . . . 
communication,” would have required adopting a fairly implausible 
reading of the statutory text—a reading not a single justice on the Court 
was willing to endorse in a published opinion. 
When Citizens United was finally decided, after reargument, the 
Chief Justice joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, invalidating 
the relevant provisions of the BCRA on First Amendment grounds. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court was quite expansive (as is his 
wont).80 The Court’s opinion rejected the various statutory arguments 
presented by the petitioners to reach the underlying constitutional 
question. In the process, it swept aside prior Court precedents and 
embraced a broad constitutional holding that continues to resonate in the 
lower federal courts. 
Although Chief Justice Roberts ultimately joined Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion rejecting a potential saving construction of the BCRA, reporting 
 
75 One possible reason that these arguments were not embraced in King is because they could 
have had far-reaching implications for the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. See Jonathan H. Adler, 
“Could King v. Burwell overturn parts of New York v. United States?” The Volokh Conspiracy, 
Mar. 5, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/05/could-
king-v-burwell-overturn-parts-of-new-york-v-united-states/?utm_term=.f9dd0c706734. 
 76 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 77 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (2012). 
 78 See 558 U.S at 319–20. 
 79 Id. at 323. 
 80 On the relationship of Citizens United to the Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
more broadly, see Joel Gora, In the Business of Free Speech: The Roberts Court and Citizens 
United, in BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT 255 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016). 
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by Jeffrey Toobin for the New Yorker suggests Roberts—and Roberts 
alone—had been willing to adopt a saving construction of the statute.81 
After Citizens United was first argued Roberts drafted a narrow opinion 
holding for Citizens United on statutory grounds, Toobin reports.82 This 
opinion interpreted the BCRA so as to avoid the constitutional question 
lurking within the case.83 Unlike in NAMUDNO, however, this approach 
did not produce a majority opinion. Indeed, insofar as the Chief Justice’s 
attempt to resolve the case on narrow statutory grounds produced 
unanimity on the Court, it was unanimity in rejecting the Chief Justice’s 
approach. Every other justice on the Court thought the constitutional 
issue had to be addressed. Four justices saw no constitutional problems 
with limiting electioneering communications that could justify stretching 
the statute’s text, and four justices thought the statute violated the First 
Amendment.84 
After Roberts circulated this opinion, Toobin reports, Justice 
Kennedy circulated a concurrence reiterating his view that the BCRA was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.85 The other conservative 
justices apparently found Kennedy’s opinion more compelling than the 
Chief Justice’s effort to read Citizen United’s video out of the statute’s 
converage, and reportedly signed on. This left Roberts as the only justice 
willing to adopt a saving construction of the statute. Given the alternative 
of authoring a solo opinion embracing a statutory interpretation rejected 
by every other justice on the Court, Roberts reportedly acquiesced to 
Kennedy’s approach. As Toobin recounts, some of the dissenters 
complained that the broader First Amendment questions were not 
properly before the Court, prompting the Court to schedule a re-argument 
with supplemental briefing that would place the First Amendment 
question front and center.86 
In his New Yorker article, Toobin dwells on Justice Stevens’s 
complaint that the Court’s broad holding in Citizens United was 
unnecessary, as the Court could have held for the petitioners on narrower, 
statutory grounds. Yet as Toobin’s own reporting recounts, Roberts was 
the only justice on the Court willing to resolve the case on such a basis. 
 
 81 See Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited, THE NEW YORKER (May 21, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/05/21/120521fa_fact_toobin. 
 82 Id. (“But after the Roberts and Kennedy drafts circulated, the conservative Justices began 
rallying to Kennedy’s more expansive resolution of the case. In light of this, Roberts withdrew his 
own opinion and let Kennedy write for the majority.”) 
 83 In its briefing, Citizens United has presented both statutory and constitutional arguments in 
support of its position. 
 84 See Tom Goldstein, Jeff Toobin on Citizens United (slightly expanded), SCOTUSBLOG (May 
14, 2012, 9:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/05/jeff-toobin-on-citizens-united. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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Four justices were ready to declare BCRA unconstitutional, and four saw 
no constitutional problem at all. In this case, Roberts had apparently 
sought a less disruptive outcome, at the expense of statutory text. The 
problem was that in Citizens United, unlike in NAMUDNO, other justices 
were not willing to play along. 
As the Chief Justice explained in his concurring opinion, if there had 
been “a valid basis for deciding this statutory claim in Citizens United’s 
favor (and thereby avoiding constitutional adjudication), it would be 
proper to do so.”87 Lacking “any valid narrower ground of decision,” the 
majority concluded there was “no way to avoid Citizens United’s broader 
constitutional argument.”88 While the dissent assailed the majority’s 
alleged activism, it too rejected Citizen United’s narrower statutory 
claim.89 Thus, the Chief Justice argued, criticisms of the majority’s 
failure to resolve the case on narrower grounds were “based on a false 
premise: that our practice of avoiding unnecessary (and unnecessarily 
broad) constitutional holdings somehow trumps our obligation faithfully 
to interpret the law.”90 
IV.     SURGICAL STRIKES 
The Chief Justice’s desire to minimize disruption can also be seen 
in his approach to severability. In those cases in which the Chief Justice 
has concluded that statutory provisions are unconstitutional, he has 
generally authored opinions that invalidate as little of the statute as 
possible. With almost surgical precision he has sought to excise the 
constitutional infirmity while leaving as much of the statutory framework 
in place as possible, thereby minimizing the practical consequences of 
the Court’s decision. 
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (FEF v. PCAOB),91 for example, the Courtconcluded that the 
structure of the PCAOB provided for under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 was unconstitutional because members of this Board could only be 
removed by the Securities and Exchange Commission for cause, and the 
SEC is similarly protected from removal-at-will by the President.92 
 
 87 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 588 U.S. 310, 374 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
 88 Id. at 375. 
 89 As the Chief Justice noted, “otherwise [the dissent’s] conclusion that the group should lose 
this case would make no sense.” Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board et al. (FEF v. 
PCAOB), 561 U.S.. 477 (2010). 
 92 Interestingly enough, no statute expressly provides that members of the SEC may only be 
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Specifically, the Court held  that it was unconstitutional to limit the ability 
of the President to remove a principal officer that is, in turn, limited in its 
ability to remove an inferior officer that determines policy and enforces 
the laws of the United States. 
Writing for the Court, the Chief Justice cabined the effects of his 
decision in FEF v. PCAOB in two ways. First, although the underlying 
rationale of his opinion would seem to raise questions about the 
constitutionality of limiting the President’s ability to remove any 
principal or inferior officer, the holding was confined to the relatively 
unique circumstance of the PCAOB.93 Second, the remedy provided by 
the Court was not to invalidate the Board or vacate any of its actions. 
Instead, all the Court did was to declare that, going forward, the SEC 
could remove members of the Board at will.94 The restriction on the 
SEC’s removal power was excised, and everything else about the statute, 
including the PCAOB, was intact.95 Even actions the PCAOB may have 
taken under the (now mistaken) belief that its members were insulated 
from political reprisals were left in place. Thus a potentially significant 
constitutional ruling was given the most minimal effect. 
The Chief Justice did something similar in the Medicaid portion of 
his decision in NFIB, as discussed above.96 Upon concluding that the 
threat to withhold all Medicaid funding from states that refused to accept 
the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive, the Chief 
Justice remedied the constitutional infirmity in the least disruptive way 
possible. Rather than invalidate the expansion as a whole (let alone the 
entire statute as the joint dissenters desired), the Chief Justice merely 
decoupled funding for the Medicaid expansion from the Medicaid 
funding streams states already received. Going forward, states would 
have to meet “old” Medicaid’s requirements to continue receiving “old” 
Medicaid funding, and states would have to meet the Medicaid 
expansions new requirements only to receive Medicaid expansion 
funding. 
As noted above, this bifurcation of Medicaid under the PPACA into 
“new” and “old” programs has no basis in the statutory text. It did, 
however, facilitate a less-disruptive judgment. By decoupling the 
 
removed by the President for cause, but this has been assumed for some time, and was assumed by 
the Court in reaching its judgment about the constitutionality of the limitation on the removal of 
members of the PCAOB. See id. at 487 (noting that Court decides the case with the “understanding” 
that “Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President except under the Humphrey's 
Executor standard of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,’”). 
 93 See Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. 
REV. 1205 (2014); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, On Candor, Free Enterprise Fund, and the Theory 
of the Unitary Executive, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 337 (2013). 
94 FEF v PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 508-10. 
95 Id. 
96 See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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programs, the Chief Justice protected the reliance interests of 
participating states, even as he made it somewhat easier for states to turn 
down the expansion. The ultimate consequence, however, was to reduce 
the potential disruption that could be caused by the underlying 
constitutional judgment. 
The Chief Justice has also evinced a preference for evaluating the 
constitutionality of statutory provisions on an as-applied basis, eschewing 
facial challenges that would strike statutory provisions down altogether. 
This approach makes it easier to avoid broader-than-necessary 
constitutional rulings (if it also makes constitutional challenges to federal 
statutes more difficult).97 Just as Chief Justice Roberts has sought to find 
saving constructions of federal statutes to preserve their constitutionality 
and look to invalidate as little of a statute as possible, he embraces as-
applied challenges as a means to excise potentially unconstitutional 
applications of an otherwise constitutional statutory scheme, even if it 
means adopting a more elastic understanding of the relevant statutory 
text. 
In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), 
for example, Roberts concluded that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act’s limitations on corporate funding of “electioneering 
communications” were unconstitutional as-applied to the appellants’ 
issue advertisements, effectively rewriting the relevant statutory 
provisions in the process.98 In WRTL Roberts both rejected Justice 
Scalia’s entreaty to invalidate the challenged provision on its face and 
eschewed reliance on the statute’s “backup” definition of electioneering 
communications that would have been triggered as a result. Here, as with 
his approach to statutory interpretation, the Chief Justice adopted an 
approach calculated to minimize the decision’s potentially disruptive 
effects. 
CONCLUSION 
During his confirmation hearings, then-Judge John Roberts 
compared the role of a judge to that of an umpire in a baseball game. 
“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. 
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody 
 
 97 See Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing 
Nature and Rising Importance of as-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election 
Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2009); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and as-Applied 
Challenges under the Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 773 (2009). 
 98 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. 449 (2007). See 
also Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 97, at 1662 (“In doing so, the Court rewrites a law that does 
not need to be rewritten and does so in a way that Congress specifically avoided.”). 
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plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game 
to see the umpire.”99 Most critical commentary on these remarks focused 
on the Chief Justice’s implicit comparison between deciding cases and 
calling balls and strikes. The comparison is strained as the respective 
decisions are not comparable. Different umpires may apply different 
strike zones, just as different judges may apply different interpretive 
philosophies, but the latter clearly implicated normative concerns in a 
way the former does not. Deciding a case, particularly at the appellate 
level, often requires far more than determining on which side of the line 
a given case falls. Further, however much judges strive to make the most 
accurate call, they inevitably and necessarily resort to jurisprudential 
priors to resolve difficult cases, particularly those that raise issues of first 
impression. 
Less-remarked upon is Roberts suggestion that spectators don’t go 
to games to see the umpire. Rather, they are there to see the players play. 
A good game is not one that turns on a contested call, but where the 
outcome is clearly and fairly determined by the players’ actions on the 
field. A good umpire, in this view, is scarcely noticed. This is Roberts’s 
prescription for judges. 
For a Burkean minimalist like Roberts, the Court should strive to be 
less conspicuous in public affairs, maintain the status quo, and avoid 
unnecessarily disruptive holdings. Not only does this perspective 
influence the Chief Justice’s approach to statutory interpretation, it may 
also explain why he has voted fairly consistently to narrow the scope of 
Article III standing, heighten pleading requirements and deny new 
opportunities for private plaintiffs to file suit against public and private 
plaintiffs alike.100 
Chief Justice Roberts has been relatively consistent in pursuing his 
brand of minimalism, but that does not mean he has been right to do so. 
The analysis presented here is descriptive, not normative. Whatever the 
merits of his approach, the Chief Justice’s strained efforts to narrow 
holdings has not always been successful, and has prompted stinging 
criticism from his colleagues and outside commentators. In one case 
Roberts’s reluctance to act more boldly prompted Justice Scalia to accuse 
him of “faux judicial restraint.”101 There is often room for reasonable 
people to differ on the best interpretation of a complex statute, but some 
of the Chief Justice’s opinions seem to stretch interpretive choices 
 
 99 Hearing on the Nominations of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justices of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
 100 On the Chief Justice’s approach to Article III standing, see Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still 
in the Roberts Court, 59 CASE W. RES, L. REV. 1061 (2009). 
 101 See WRTL, 551 U.S. at 499 n. 7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.). 
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beyond their breaking point. 
Chief Justice Roberts has said that one of his goals is to promote 
greater stability and predictability in the law. Narrow holdings and broad 
unanimity may serve this goal, but not if they come at the expense of 
interpretive predictability. The more willing the Court is to stretch 
statutory text to avoid disruptive consequences, the more difficult it is for 
regulated entities and the public at large to know whether courts will 
interpret statutes to mean what they appear to say. In this regard, it is 
unclear whether the Chief Justice’s minimalism advances his view of the 
courts and the rule of law. 
